

# A MIRROR MAKING ALL THINGS CLEAR

A Presentation of Signs and Reasonings

*by Geshe Tsultrim Namgyel*



*Translated by Geshe Graham Woodhouse*

**A Mirror Making All Things Clear**  
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ཕྱེད་ཤེས་གཉེན་ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་ཞབས།  
 The Venerable Spiritual Friend, Tsultrim Namgyel

Woodcut of Geshe Tsultrim Namgyel from the 1995 Gaden woodblock print edition.

The text

*A Mirror Making All Things Clear, a Presentation of Signs and Reasonings*, rtags rigs kyi rnam gzhag chos kun gsal ba'i me long, in *The Magical Key to Open a Hundred Gates on the Path of Reasoning*, Vol. 1, rigs lam sgo brgya 'byed pa'i 'phrul gyi lde mig dang po, Mundgod, India: Drepung Loseling Library Society, 2015. Also consulted, a woodblock edition from south India, from blocks carved in 1995: Mundgod, India: Gaden Library, 1995.

The author

Geshe Tsultrim Namgyel Palsang, *dge bshes tshul khrims rnam rgyal dpal bzang* was born during the thirteenth sexagenary [*rabjung*, i.e., the 60 years between 1747 and 1806] in a place called Drakhog in Minyak, Eastern Tibet. He graduated as a lharampa geshe from Drepung Loseling Monastic College and served as one of the tutors of the 11th Dalai Lama, Khedrup Gyatso [1838-1855].

## Translator's Introduction

Through being obscured by ignorance,  
By karma that's the doing of  
Three types of deeds for being reborn,  
The one who migrates migrates on.

Nāgārjuna<sup>1</sup>

The reasoning consciousness is the human being's speciality. This is what it is worth being born human for! My own quest has been lame and feeble but still I have delighted in studying in my small way the reasons put forward to establish the crucial points of the Buddhist path to full enlightenment, the hinges on which the whole door turns. There is Buddha's subtle delineation of suffering, which necessitates an understanding of subtle impermanence. There is the bold Bodhisattva practice of exchanging self and others. There is the wisdom which transcends samsara without by any means forsaking samsaric beings. Using our reasoning power instead just to devise ingenious ways to ameliorate the pangs and discomforts of this very life may help for a while, but all that has gone very wrong somehow, we have overspent our budget, a major climate oscillation is underway and it seems that an incalculable price will soon have to be paid, and indeed is already being paid by many species.

What we have to evaluate then is Buddha's teaching that a deep-seated ignorance and selfishness are at the root of all our frustrations. They can be opposed. We can eliminate them with the wisdom and unconditional love that are the true potential of

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<sup>1</sup> *Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle Way*, mūlamadhyamakakārikā, dbu ma rtse ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa, chapter XXVI verse 1, *Pedurma*, vol. 57, p. 41, l. 10. [bstan 'gyur dpe bsdur ma, pe cin: krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang, 1994-2008.]

all of us. Maybe love turns out to be the ultimate alternative clean fuel, the one the Buddhas run on!

As Shāntideva says

Whatever happiness within this world  
All comes from wanting others' happiness.  
Whatever suffering within this world  
All comes from wanting happiness for ME.<sup>2</sup>

In the first place our root self-grasping and self-cherishing have to be identified and undermined with reasoning, a powerful antidote. The purer our understanding of the reasoning process then, the stronger and more confident our meditations will be, hence the great value of studying the process of reasoning itself—and that is the subject matter of the text translated here. *Signs and Reasonings* is a basic teaching. Ultimate wisdom is barely mentioned at this stage. We focus on the practice of logical argument itself, from a preparatory, moderately realist perspective.

For students following the curriculum of philosophy in the tradition of Tsongkhapa at Drepung Loseling and Gaden Shartse Monastic Colleges, Geshe Tsaltrim Namgyel's *Signs and Reasonings* is the third in a series of beginner's texts all in the same first volume of the *Magical Key* series mentioned above. In studying the first, *Collected Topics, bsdus grwa*, the student learns the fundamentals of the Buddhist view, encounters not a few of the problems involved in constructing a view in the first place and learns the rudiments of logical reasoning. The second volume, *Awareness and Knowledge, blo rig*, is an investigation of consciousness and its types. Our third volume here is a similar overview of reasoning and its types. Sign means logical mark or reason. It is the evidence that is given to establish that which,

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<sup>2</sup> *Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa, chapter VIII, verse 129, *Pedurma*, vol. 61, p. 1011, l. 16.



not being manifest to the ordinary senses, has to be proven by deduction from some other fact.

Most of the material in *Collected Topics, Awareness and Knowledge* and *Signs and Reasonings* is adapted from the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who stand pre-eminent in the Indian tradition of Buddhist logic. Working through the above three textbooks in the order mentioned then is the ideal preparation or the ‘magical key’ for unlocking the treasure casket of these masters’ exceptionally condensed verse compositions and likewise the other masterpieces of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy in the curriculum at a monastic university such as Drepung.

Katherine Rogers is the pioneer translator of a Tibetan Signs and Reasonings monastic textbook into English. Her PhD thesis and later her book, *Tibetan Logic*,<sup>3</sup> have always been a great help. I have in fact followed her translation of most technical terms for the sake of simplicity for other students. I trust this will be taken as a compliment rather than as plagiarism! Of course, I have parted company with her in one or two places, notably in translating the names of divisions of non-observation signs.

Drepung Loseling beginners’ textbooks are typically very concise. Much is left for the teacher to explain and the students to debate. A explanatory commentary has been written on Geshe Tsultrim Namgyel’s text by Rabjampa Lozang Sonam, called *A Mirror Making Queries Clear That are Raised by the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings*.<sup>4</sup> It would be worthwhile in the future to translate that text as a complement to this one.

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<sup>3</sup> Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2009.

<sup>4</sup> rab ’byams pa blo bzang bsod nams: rtags rigs kyi rnam gzhag la dogs slong gsal ba’i me long. Dharamsala: Institute of Buddhist Dialectics, 2016.

The numbers in square brackets in the text refer to the page numbers of the Loseling 2015 edition.

Verse 1 of Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on [Dignāga's Compendium of] Valid Cognition* in Sanskrit, Tibetan and English<sup>5</sup>

पक्षधर्मस्तदंशेन व्याप्तो हेतुस्त्रिधैव सः।  
अविनाभावनियमाद्धेत्वाभासास्ततोऽपरे ॥ १ ॥

ཐོགས་ཆོས་དེ་ཆས་བྱས་པ་ཡི།  
གཏན་ཆེགས་དེ་ནི་རྣམ་གསུང་ཉིད།  
མེད་ན་མི་འབྱུང་ངེས་ཕྱིར་རོ།  
གཏན་ཆེགས་སྟར་སྟངས་དེ་ལས་གཞན། ॥ १ ॥

A reason is the *pakṣa*'s property,  
Pervaded by its part; three types because  
'No this, that won't arise' is definite;  
The other than those quasi-reasonings. 1

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<sup>5</sup> *pramāṇavārttikakārikā*, tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, *Pedurma* vol. 97, p. 469, l. 9.

## A Mirror Making All Things Clear

### A Presentation of Signs and Reasonings

I bow down to the Lama and Manjushri.

Who sends a nectar stream of eloquence,  
A boon to fill the vessel of my mind,  
To Sonam Drakpa, Dharma lord,<sup>6</sup> I bow.  
His stream of speech let me convey in brief.

#### Signs

Here, with respect to the explanation of the presentation of reasoning, the basis of inference, there are three: definitions, divisions (p. 11) and explanation of the faults and good qualities of the three, sign, example and position [probandum] (p. 39).

The first: **that which is set as a sign** is the definition of sign. If applied to a base, **that which is set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of sign in the proof of sound as impermanent.

If it is selfless, it is necessarily set as a sign in general and set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent in particular. But if it is that, it is not necessarily set as a sign in the proof of sound as

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<sup>6</sup> Panchen Sonam Drakpa, paṇ chen bsod nams grags pa, 1478-1554, uniquely, abbot in turn of all three great Gelugpa monastic seats in the vicinity of Lhasa, Sera, Drepung and Gaden, 15th Gaden Tripa. Main textbook author for Drepung Loseling and Gaden Shartse Monastic Colleges.

impermanent by the sign product [63] because, if it is set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product, it must be one with product. Apply similarly to others.

With respect to the second (fr. p. 10), divisions, there are two: an explanation of correct signs and an explanation of quasi-signs (p. 31).

## Correct Signs

With respect to the first there are three: an explanation of the bases of relation of correct signs, an explanation of definitions (p. 13) and of divisions (p. 16).

With respect to the first there are two: an explanation of the basis of relation of the property of the subject, the subject sought to be known, and an explanation of the bases of relation of the pervasion, the two, the similar class and the dissimilar class.

The first: **it is held as the basis of debate in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product and there exists a person who, having ascertained by valid cognition that it is a product, is engaged in wanting to know whether or not it is impermanent** is the definition of the faultless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product.

If it is the faultless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, it is necessarily one with sound and so forth. Apply similarly to other cases. [64]

With respect to the second, the explanation of the bases of relation of the pervasion, the similar class and the dissimilar class, there are two: the actual explanation and, ancillary to that, the identification of similar examples and dissimilar examples (p. 12).

The first: **that which is, in accordance with the mode of proof, not empty of impermanence in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent. The two, it and impermanent are equivalent.

**That which is empty of that** is the definition of dissimilar class in the proof of that. The two, it and not being impermanent, are equivalent.

If divided, there are three: contradictory dissimilar class, other dissimilar class, and non-existent dissimilar class in the proof of sound as impermanent. Permanent is the first, object of knowledge the second and rabbit horn the third.

The second (fr. p 11): **that which is held as a similar example** is the definition of similar example. **That which is held as a similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent. The pattern that should be known is that if it is selfless, it is necessarily a similar example in general and a similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent in particular, but it is not necessarily a correct similar example in the proof of that. [65]

**It is observed as a common base of (i) being held as a similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product and (ii) possessing the definition of correct similar example in the proof of that** is the definition of correct similar example in the proof of that.

For example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, sound: it is impermanent because it is a product, for example, just like pot,' pot, for instance.

**It is observed as a common base of (i) being held as a dissimilar example which does not possess the two, the sign and the**

**predicate, in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product and (ii) possessing the definition of correct dissimilar example in the proof of that** is the definition of correct dissimilar example in that case.

For example, at the time of stating, ‘The subject, sound: it is impermanent because it is a product, for example, just like uncomposed space,’ uncomposed space, for instance.

The second (fr. p. 11): **that which is the three modes** is the definition of correct sign. **That which is the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product** is the definition of correct sign in that case. Understand the way of applying that to others.

[66] Well then, what are the three modes? The property of the subject, the forward pervasion (p. 14) and the counter pervasion (p. 15).

The first: **by the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent,<sup>7</sup> it is ascertained as only existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, on sound** is the definition of it being the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent.

There is a purpose for stating ‘existent’ as part of that definition because it is for the sake of excluding object of apprehension of eye consciousness as the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent. In dependence upon this word, it being

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<sup>7</sup> *sgra mi rtag sgrub la phyogs chos can du song ba'i gang zag gis...* Literally, ‘By the person for whom it has become a property that the *pakṣa* [Skt., Tib. *phyogs*] possesses in the proof of sound as impermanent...’ Generally *pakṣa* is equivalent to probandum or thesis [subject plus predicate] and may be translated as position, but in this context it refers to the *subject* only [as also in the verse by Dharmakīrti quoted in the introduction]. It has therefore been translated as subject here for the sake of simplicity.

that is eliminated because object of apprehension of eye consciousness does not exist on sound; because sound is not an object of apprehension of eye consciousness.

There is a purpose for stating 'only' because it is for the sake of excluding sleeps at night with its leaves curled as the property of the subject in the proof of tree as sentient. In dependence upon this word, it being that is eliminated because although sleeps at night with its leaves curled exists with tree, it does not solely exist with that; because it does not exist with all of them; [67] because if it is a tree it does not necessarily sleep at night with its leaves curled.

There is a purpose for stating 'only' before 'existent' but not before 'it'<sup>8</sup> because it is for the sake of excluding solely an object of hearing as the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent. In dependence upon this phrasing it being that is eliminated because object of hearing solely exists with sound but solely it does not exist with sound because object of comprehension also exists with sound.

There is a purpose for stating 'ascertained' because it is for the sake of excluding product as the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent for a disputant who has doubt as to whether sound is a product or not.

The second (fr. p. 13): **by the person for whom it has become the second mode of the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent, it is ascertained as existent solely in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of it being the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent.

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<sup>8</sup> Translation adjusted to take account of different word order in Tibetan and English.

There is a purpose for stating 'existent' as part of that because it is for the sake of excluding product as the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as permanent. [68] In dependence upon this word, it being that is eliminated because product does not exist in the similar class in the proof of sound as permanent.

There is a purpose for stating 'solely' because it is for the sake of excluding object of comprehension as the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent. In dependence upon this word, it being that is eliminated because object of comprehension does not exist solely in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent; because it exists in both the similar class and the dissimilar class in the proof of that.

There is a purpose for stating 'solely' after 'existent' and not before<sup>9</sup> because it has the purpose of indicating arisen from effort as the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent. In dependence upon this phrasing it being that is understood because arisen from effort exists solely with impermanent but it does not solely exist with impermanent; because it does not exist with all of them; because it does not exist with a rocky mountain not arisen from effort.

There is a purpose for stating 'ascertained' because it is for the sake of excluding speaks speech as the forward pervasion in the the proof of the person speaking speech over there being omniscient. [69]

The third (fr. p 13): **by the person for whom it has become the third mode of the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent, it is ascertained as only non-existent in the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of it being the counter pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent.

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<sup>9</sup> See note 8



There is a purpose for stating 'non-existent' as part of that because it is for the sake of excluding product as the counter pervasion in the proof of sound as permanent. In dependence upon this word, it being that is eliminated because product exists in the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent.

There is a purpose for stating 'only' because it is for the sake of excluding impermanent as the counter pervasion in the proof of the sound of a conch as arisen from effort. In dependence upon this word, it being that is eliminated because impermanent is not only non-existent in the dissimilar class in the proof of the sound of a conch as arisen from exertion; because if it is the dissimilar class in the proof of that it is not necessarily impermanent and not necessarily not impermanent; because lightning, the dissimilar class in the proof of that, is impermanent and space is not.

There is a purpose for stating 'only' before 'non-existent' [70] and not after<sup>10</sup> because it is for the sake of indicating arisen from effort as the counter pervasion in the proof of the sound of a conch as impermanent. In dependence upon this phrasing it being that can be understood because arisen from effort is solely non-existent in the dissimilar class in the proof of the sound of a conch as impermanent but it is not non-existent solely in the dissimilar class in the proof of that because, since it is also non-existent with a rocky mountain not arisen from effort, the similar class in the proof of that, it may be explained in that way.

With respect to the third (fr. p. 11), the explanation of the divisions of correct signs, there are six: (i) division by way of entity (p. 17), (ii) division by way of the predicate of the probandum (p. 26), (iii) division by way of the mode of proof (p. 26), (iv) division by way of the probandum (p. 28), (v) division by

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<sup>10</sup> See note 8

way of relating to the similar class (p. 30) and (vi) division by way of the disputant (p. 31).

With respect to the first (fr. p. 16), there are three: correct effect signs, correct nature signs (p. 18), and correct non-observation signs (p. 19). With respect to the first, there are two: definitions and divisions.

## Correct Effect Signs

The first: **that which is the three effect modes** is the definition of correct effect sign. If applied to a base: **on the one hand there is a common base of being held as the explicit predicate [71] of the probandum in the proof of the existence of fire on the smoky pass by the sign smoke and being the cause of smoke, and also it is the three modes in the proof of the existence of fire on the smoky pass by the sign smoke** is the definition of correct effect sign in the proof of the existence of fire on the smoky pass by the sign smoke.

With respect to the second, divisions, there are five: (i) correct effect sign which proves a cause direct, (ii) correct effect sign which proves a preceding cause, (iii) correct effect sign which proves a particular cause, (iv) correct effect sign which proves the self-isolate of cause, (v) and correct effect sign which is a means of inferring a causal attribute.

The first: at the time of stating, 'The subject, on the smoky pass: fire exists because smoke exists,' smoke, for instance.

The second: at the time of stating, 'The subject, the smoke in the sky: it is preceded by its cause, earlier fire, because it is smoke,' smoke, for instance.

The third: at the time of stating, 'The subject, the sense direct perceiver apprehending form: a condition of it exists which is

other than its dominant condition and its immediately preceding condition because it is not produced merely by its dominant condition and immediately preceding condition being complete and it is occasionally produced,' that, for instance.

The fourth: at the time of stating, [72] 'The subject, the appropriated aggregates: they have their own causes because they are occasionally produced,' that, for instance.

The fifth: at the time of stating, 'The subject, on the lump of jaggery in the mouth: there exists the ability of the earlier taste of jaggery to produce the present form of jaggery because the present taste of jaggery exists,' that, for instance.

## Correct Nature Signs

Secondly (fr. p. 17), with respect to correct nature signs, there are two: definitions and divisions.

The first: **that which is the three nature modes** is the definition of correct nature sign. If applied to a base: **if it is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product, it is necessarily the same essence as product, and it is the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product** is the definition of correct nature sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product.

With respect to the second, if divided, there are two: correct nature sign which involves a particular and correct nature sign which is free of a particular.

[73] The first: **on the basis of it being a correct sign, the term which expresses it indicates its own agent** is the definition of correct nature sign which involves a particular. If divided, there are two: the term which expresses it explicitly indicates or

implicitly indicates its own agent. Arisen from exertion is a correct nature sign, in the proof of the sound of a conch as impermanent, in which the term which expresses it explicitly indicates its own agent and product is a correct nature sign, in the proof of sound as impermanent, in which it implicitly indicates such.

The second: **on the basis of it being a correct sign, the term which expresses it does not indicate its own agent** is the definition of correct nature sign which is free of a particular. Functioning thing is a correct nature sign, in the proof of sound as impermanent, which is free of a particular.

## Correct Non-observation Signs

Thirdly (fr. p. 17), with respect to correct non-observation signs, there are two: definition and divisions.

The first: [74] **it is a correct sign in the proof of that and also there exists a common base of being held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of that by the sign of it and being a negative phenomenon** is the definition of it being a correct non-observation sign in the proof of that.

With respect to the second, if divided, there are two: correct non-observation sign for the non-appearing and correct non-observation sign for the suitable to appear (p. 21).

With respect to the first, again there are two: definition and divisions (p. 20).

The first: **(i) it is a correct non-observation sign in the proof of the non-engagement of a factually concordant subsequent cognizer ascertaining the existence of a flesh-eater in the place in front by the person for whom, with respect to flesh-eaters, a flesh-eater is beyond his ken and (ii) the object designated as**

**the predicate of the negandum in the proof of that by the sign of it being existent, the object designated as the predicate of the negandum in the proof of that by the sign of it is not suitable to appear, to a valid cognizer of the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that, on the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of that by the sign of it** is the definition of it being a correct non-observation sign for the non-appearing in the proof of that.

With respect to the second (fr. p. 19), [75] if divided, there are two: correct sign for the non-appearing that is the non-observation of a relational counterpart<sup>11</sup> and correct sign for the non-appearing that is the observation of a contradictory counterpart (p. 21).

The first: **a common base of being a correct non-observation sign for the non-appearing and also a non-affirming negative** is the definition of correct sign for the non-appearing which is the non-observation of a relational counterpart.

If divided, there are two: correct sign for the non-appearing that is a cause not observed and correct sign for the non-appearing that is a pervader not observed.

The first: at the time of stating, 'The subject, here in the place in front: with regard to a flesh eater, a person for whom a flesh eater is beyond his ken does not develop a factually concordant

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<sup>11</sup> What is intended by the term relational counterpart? It is a translation of '*brel zla*'. Firstly, the meaning of the word 'related' in this context, from Drepung Loseling *Collected Topics*: 'It is different from that and by the power of the reversal of that it is reversed, is the definition of it being related with that.' In the case of smoke being related with, or depending on, its cause, fire, smoke is that which relates, the relater. (In English, as above, a passive construction is often used—smoke is related with, or to, fire.) Fire is that to which smoke is related. In that sense fire is 'that which is related to,' 'the related to.' Tibetan frequently employs the word *yul*, object, here, so fire is the '*brel yul*, the object related to, hence relational object. Occasionally we find '*brel zla* in place of '*brel yul*, so, relational counterpart.

subsequent cognizer ascertaining the existence of a flesh eater because, with regard to a flesh eater, a person for whom a flesh eater is beyond his ken does not observe a flesh eater with a valid cognizer,' that, for instance.

The second: at the time of stating, 'The subject, here in the place in front: with regard to a flesh eater, it is not correct for a person for whom a flesh eater is beyond his ken to assert that a flesh eater exists because, with regard to a flesh eater, a person for whom a flesh eater is beyond his ken does not observe a flesh eater with a valid cognizer,' that, for instance. [76]

Secondly (fr. p. 20), correct sign for the non-appearing that is the observation of a contradictory counterpart: **a common base of being a correct non-observation sign for the non-appearing and either an affirming negative or a positive** is the definition of correct sign for the non-appearing which is the observation of a contradictory counterpart.

For example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, here in the place in front: with regard to a flesh eater, a person for whom a flesh eater is beyond his ken does not develop a factually concordant subsequent cognizer ascertaining the existence of a flesh eater because it exists,' that, for instance.

With respect to the second (fr. p. 19), correct non-observation sign for the suitable to appear, there are two: definitions and divisions (p. 22).

The first: **that which is the three non-observation modes for the suitable to appear in the proof of that** is the definition of correct non-observation sign for the suitable to appear in the proof of that.

If applied to a base: **it is a correct non-observation sign in the proof of sound as not permanent and if the object designated as the predicate of the negandum in the proof of that by the**

**sign of it existed, the object designated as the predicate of the negandum in the proof of that by the sign of it would necessarily be suitable to appear, on the flawless subject sought to be known [77] in the proof of that by the sign of it, to a valid cognizer of the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that** is the definition of it being a correct non-observation sign for the suitable to appear in the proof of that.

Secondly (fr. p. 21), if divided, there are two: correct sign for the suitable to appear that is the non-observation of a relational object and correct sign for the suitable to appear that is the observation of a contradictory (p. 23).

The first: **a common base of the three non-observation modes for the suitable to appear in the proof of that and a non-affirming negative** is the definition of correct sign for the suitable to appear that is the non-observation of a relational object.

Secondly, if divided, there are four: (i) correct sign for the suitable to appear which is the non-observation of a pervader, (ii) correct sign for the suitable to appear which is the non-observation of a cause, (iii) correct sign for the suitable to appear which is the non-observation of a nature and (iv) correct sign for the suitable to appear which is the non-observation of a direct effect.

The first: for example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, on a treeless rocky cliff: an ashoka<sup>12</sup> does not exist because a tree does not exist,' the non-existence of tree, for instance.

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<sup>12</sup> The tree *saraca asoca*.

The second: for example, at the time of stating, ‘The subject, on a fireless lake at night: smoke does not exist [78] because fire does not exist,’ the non-existence of fire, for instance.

The third: at the time of stating, ‘The subject, on a place where pot is not observed by valid cognition: pot does not exist because pot is not observed by valid cognition,’ the non-observation of pot by valid cognition, for instance.

The fourth: for example, at the time of stating, ‘The subject, within a roofless enclosure which is devoid of smoke: the direct cause of smoke, potential unobstructed, does not exist because smoke does not exist,’ that, for instance.

Well then, it follows that smoke is a relational counterpart of the direct cause of smoke because the non-existence of smoke eliminates the direct effect of a relational counterpart of the direct cause of smoke. If accepted, it follows that the direct cause of smoke is related with smoke. In that case may Jetsunpa’s remark in his *Commentary on Valid Cognition Final Analysis*<sup>13</sup> that the direct cause of smoke is subsequently related with smoke be considered correct?

Secondly (fr. p. 22), with respect to correct sign for the suitable to appear that is the observation of a contradictory, there are two: definition and divisions.

The first: **a common base of the three non-observation modes for the suitable to appear in the proof of that and either an affirming negative [79] or a positive** is the definition of correct sign for the suitable to appear that is the observation of a contradictory in the proof of that.

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<sup>13</sup> Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen, rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtsan. Possibly his *Illuminating the Thought*, dgongs pa rab gsal, commentary on the first chapter of Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*.



Secondly, if divided there are two: correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of not abiding together and correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion (p. 26).

The first: **a common base of being a correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory in the proof of that and being a different substance from the functioning thing that is the object designated as a predicate of the negandum in the proof of that** is the definition of correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of not abiding together in the proof of that.

If divided, there are three: correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of matter not abiding together, correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of consciousnesses not abiding together (p. 25) and correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of living beings not abiding together (p. 25).

Again, with respect to the first, there are six: (i) correct sign observing that contradictory with a cause, (ii) observing that contradictory with a pervader, (iii) observing that contradictory with a nature, [80] (iv) observing a contradictory effect contradictory, (v) observing that contradictory with an effect and (vi) observing an effect contradictory with a cause.

The first: for example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, the fire in the east: it does not abide together with goose-pimples, the effect of cold, without harming because it is fire,' fire, for instance.

The second: for example, at the time of stating, 'That subject: it does not abide together with the tangible object of snow without harming because it is fire,' fire, for instance.

The third: for example, at the time of stating, 'That subject: it does not abide together with the tangible object cold without harming because it is fire,' fire, for instance.

The fourth: for example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, the strongly billowing smoke in the east: it does not abide together with the tangible object cold without harming because it is strongly billowing smoke,' that, for instance.

The fifth: for example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, the fire in the east: it does not abide together with the cause of cold, potential unobstructed, without harming because it is fire,' that, for instance.

The sixth: for example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, the strongly billowing smoke in the east: it does not abide together with goose-pimples, the effect of cold, [81] without harming because it is strongly billowing smoke,' that, for instance.

That is the simply the mode of applying the term, 'not abiding together without harming.' It should be understood that the predicate of the negandum is either an effect of, an object pervaded by, the entity of, or a cause of the tangible object cold.

The second (fr. p 24), correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of consciousnesses not abiding together: at the time of stating, 'The subject, the uninterrupted hearer path of meditation which is the direct antidote to grasping a self of persons: it does not abide together with grasping a self of persons without harming because it is the direct antidote to grasping a self of persons,' that, for instance.

The third (fr. p 24): correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of living beings not abiding together: for example, at the time of stating, 'The

subject, the crow in the east: it does not abide together with an owl without harming because it is a crow,' that, for instance. [82]

The second (fr. p. 24): correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion. **A common base of being a correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory in the proof of that and also not being a different substance from the functioning thing that is the object designated as a predicate of the negandum in the proof of that** is the definition of correct sign that is the observation of a contradictory contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion in the proof of that.

For example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, a sprout: its production again is pointless because it exists,' exists, for instance.

## Other Ways of Dividing Correct Signs

Secondly (fr. p 16), if correct signs are divided by way of the predicate of the probandum, there are two: correct sign of a negative and correct sign of a positive.

**It is the three modes in the proof of that and if it is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of that it is necessarily a negative** is the definition of correct sign of a negative in the proof of that.

Secondly, **it is the three modes in the proof of that and if it is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of that it is necessarily a positive** is the definition of correct sign of a positive in the proof of that. [83]

Thirdly (fr. p. 16), if correct signs are divided according to the mode of proof, there are two: correct sign which proves a term

in the proof of that and correct sign which proves a meaning in the proof of that.

The first: **if it is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of that, it is necessarily a definiendum and also it is the three modes in the proof of that** is the definition of correct sign which proves a term in the proof of that.

Product is a correct sign which proves a term in the proof of sound as impermanent because it is a correct sign which proves only a term in the proof of that; because a disputant for whom it has become a correct sign that proves only a term in the proof of that exists; because for a disputant who, having established that sound is momentary, has not forgotten that and for whom product has become the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent, product is a correct sign which proves only a term in the proof of sound as impermanent. That follows because for him product is a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent and that person has established that sound is momentary and has not forgotten. [84]

Thereby, for a disputant who has not established that sound is momentary and for whom product has become the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent, product is a correct sign which proves a term in the proof of sound as impermanent but for him product is not a correct sign which proves only a term in the proof of that because it has to be established for that disputant that sound is momentary.

If someone says, it is not tenable that product is a correct sign which proves a term in the proof of sound as impermanent because if it is held as an explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of that by the sign of it, it is not necessarily a definiendum; because momentary is held as an explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product,

The reason is not established because sound being momentary is not a correct explicit probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product. That follows, because if it is a person who has established that by valid cognition, he is not necessarily a person who has established by valid cognition the correct explicit probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product; because if he is that, he is not necessarily a person who has established that sound is impermanent by valid cognition; [85] because momentary is a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent.

There is a pervasion because the ascertainment by valid cognition of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign momentary must necessarily be preceded by the establishment by valid cognition of the three modes of the prover [probans, sign] in the proof of that by the sign of it.

The second: **if it is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of that, it is necessarily a definition and also it is the three modes in the proof of that** is the definition of correct sign proving a meaning in the proof of that. Product is a correct sign proving a meaning in the proof of sound as momentary.

So thus it should be accepted that, if it is a correct sign proving that, it is not necessarily either a correct sign proving a term in the proof of that or a correct sign proving a meaning in the proof of that and, if it is a correct sign proving a meaning in the proof of that, it cannot be a correct sign proving a term in the proof of that but, if it is a correct sign proving a term in the proof of that, it is necessarily a correct sign proving only a term in the proof of that.

[86] Fourthly (fr. p 16), if correct signs are divided by way of the probandum, there are three: correct sign of belief, correct sign of renown, correct sign by the power of the fact.

The first: **if it is the explicit probandum in the proof that the scripture, 'From giving, resources, from morality, happiness,' is incontrovertible with regard what it teaches by the sign of being a scripture verified by the three investigations, it is necessarily a very hidden phenomenon and it is the three modes in the proof of such a scripture as being such by the sign of it** is the definition of correct sign of belief in the proof of such a scripture being such by the sign of it.

If divided, there are three: correct effect, nature, and non-observation signs of belief.

The second: **if it is the explicit probandum in the proof that the hare-possessor is suitable to be called 'moon' by the sign of existing amongst objects of conception, it is necessarily a terminological suitability and it is the three modes in the proof of such by the sign of it** is the definition of correct sign of renown in the proof of such by the sign of it. [87]

If divided, there are two: correct nature sign of renown and correct non-observation sign of renown.

The third: **if it is the explicit probandum in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product, it is necessarily a slightly hidden phenomenon and also it is the three modes in the proof of such by the sign of it** is the definition of correct sign by the power of the fact in the proof of such by the sign of it.

In general if correct sign by the power of the fact is divided, there are three: correct effect, nature and non-observation sign by the power of the fact. Moreover the three, correct sign of belief and so forth are not contradictory because being a scripture verified by the three investigations is, individually, a correct sign of belief in the proof that the scripture, 'From giving, resources, from morality, happiness,' is incontrovertible with regard what it teaches, is a correct sign of renown in the proof

that such a scripture is suitable to be called 'moon' and is a correct sign by the power of the fact in the proof that such a scripture is without a self of persons. [88]

Fifthly (fr. p. 16), if correct signs are divided by way of the mode of relating to the similar class, there are two: correct sign that relates as a pervader to the similar class in the proof of that and correct sign that relates in two ways to the similar class in the proof of that.

The first: **the mode of statement in the proof that that phenomenon is that base by the sign of it is necessarily an 'is' mode of statement, whatever is that base is necessarily it and it is the three modes in the proof of that phenomenon being that base** is the definition of it being a correct sign that relates as a pervader to the similar class in the proof of that. For example, at the time of setting product as a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent, product, for instance.

The second: **the mode of statement in the proof that that phenomenon is that base by the sign of it is an 'is' mode of statement, whatever is that base is not necessarily it and is not necessarily not it either, and it is the three modes in the proof of that** is the definition of it being a correct sign that relates in two ways to the similar class in the proof of that. For example, [89] at the time of setting 'smoke is existent' as a correct effect sign in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass, the existence of smoke, for instance. Furthermore, both fire and fire exists are individually explicit predicates of the probandum in the proof that fire exists on a smoky pass but if fire exists, smoke does not necessarily exist because it says [Dharmakīrti: *Commentary on Valid Cognition*]<sup>14</sup>

Since there may be mistaken cause.

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<sup>14</sup> *Pedurma*: vol. 97, p. 592, l. 6

and because it is not ascertained from the glowing red coals in the smokeless smithy.

Sixthly (fr. p. 17), if divided by way of the disputant, there are two: correct sign for one's own purpose and correct sign for another's purpose.

The first: **it is a correct sign in the proof of that and no correct opponent exists in the proof of that by the sign of it** is the definition of it being a correct sign for one's own purpose in the proof of that. For example, at the time of setting product as the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent for a person for whom it has become a correct sign for his own purpose in the proof of sound as impermanent, product, for instance.

The second: **it is a correct sign in the proof of that and [90] a correct opponent exists in the proof of that by the sign of it** is the definition of it being a correct sign for another's purpose in the proof of that. For example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, sound: it is impermanent because of being a product,' for a correct opponent on the occasion of proving sound as impermanent by the sound product, product, for instance.

## Quasi-Signs

Secondly (fr. p. 11), with respect to the explanation of quasi-signs, there are three: the explanation of contradictory reasons, the explanation of unascertained reasons (p. 33) and the explanation of non-established reasons (p. 37).

The first: **by a person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that, it is ascertained as the perverse forward and counter pervasions in the proof of that by the sign of it** is the definition of it being a contradictory sign in the proof of that. If contradictory signs are divided terminologically, there



are four: (i) contradictory sign in the proof of the entity of a predicate, (ii) contradictory sign in the proof of a feature of a literal predicate, (iii) contradictory sign in the proof of the entity of a literal subject and (iv) contradictory sign in the proof of a feature of a literal subject. [91]

The first: at the time of stating, ‘The subject, sound: it is permanent because it is a product,’ that, for instance.

The second: at the time of stating, ‘The subjects, the eye and so forth: they the perform the function of another, an object possessor who is uncomposed, because they are composite collections,’ those, for instance.

The third: at the time of stating, ‘The subject, space which is a thing: it is permanent because it is uncomposed,’ that, for instance.

The fourth: at the time of stating, ‘The subjects, the eye and so forth of an object possessor who is uncomposed: they perform the function of another because they are composite collections,’ those, for instance.

In the speech of an Enumerator, *Sāṃkhya*, *grangs can pa*, who wishes to prove to the satisfaction of a Buddhist that the eye and so forth perform the function of a permanent self, at the time of stating, ‘The subject, the eye and so forth: they perform the function of another because they are composite collections,’ ‘composite collections’ is a contradictory sign in the proof of the eye and so forth performing the function of another but in general it is not a contradictory sign in the proof of the eye and so forth performing the function of another. There are such distinctions but, fearing too many words, I have not spelt them out here. Those who wish to know [92] may come to know by a thorough perusal of folio 34a of Panchen’s *Illuminating the*

*Thought of [Dharmakīrti's Commentary on] Valid Cognition.*<sup>15</sup> Of the two, the former and later Tibetan editions, this refers to the former.

Secondly (fr. p. 31), with respect to unascertained reasons, there are two: definition and divisions.

The first: **it is the property of the subject in the proof of that by the sign of it and it is neither ascertained as the proper forward or counter pervasions in the proof of that by the sign of it, nor is it ascertained as the perverse forward or counter pervasions in the proof of that by the sign of it** is the definition of it being an unascertained reason in the proof of that.

The second: if divided from the point of view of being, by the person for whom it has become an unascertained reason in the proof of that, either not ascertained or else ascertained as existing in common (i) on the basis of relation of the property of the subject in the proof of that, the subject sought to be known, and (ii) in either of the two bases of relation of the pervasion in the proof of that, there are two: uncommon unascertained reasons and common unascertained reasons (p. 34).

The first [93]: **it is an unascertained reason in the proof of that and, by the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that, it is not ascertained as existing in either the similar class or the dissimilar class** is the definition of it being an uncommon unascertained reason in the proof of that. For example, at the time of stating, 'The subject, sound: it is permanent because it is an object of hearing,' object of hearing, for instance, and at the time of stating possessing vitality as the sign in the proof of a living body having a self of persons, possessing vitality, for instance.

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<sup>15</sup> Panchen Sonam Drakpa, tshad ma dgongs pa rab gsal. Modern edition: Mundgod: Drepung Loseling Library Society, 2015, vol. 2 p. 319-320.

Secondly (fr. p. 33), with respect to common unascertained reasons, there are two: definition and divisions.

The first: **it is an unascertained reason in the proof of that and, by the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that, it is ascertained as existing in the similar class or dissimilar class in the proof of that** is the definition of it being a common unascertained reason in the proof of that.

Secondly, if divided there are two: actual unascertained reason and reason possessing remainder (p. 35) [94].

The first: **it is a common unascertained reason in the proof of that and, by the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that, it is ascertained as existing in both the similar class and the dissimilar class in the proof of that** is the definition of it being an actual unascertained reason in the proof of that.

If divided, there are four, as it says in [Dignāga's] *Wheel of Positions' Properties*<sup>16</sup>

Four actual unascertained.

(i) Actual unascertained reason that relates to the similar class as a pervader and to the dissimilar class as a pervader, (ii) actual unascertained reason that relates to the similar class in two ways and to the dissimilar class in two ways, (iii) actual unascertained reason that relates to the similar class in two

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<sup>16</sup> *Pedurma*: vol. 97, p. 468. The verse quoted only appears in the snar thang edition of the Tengyur in extra stanzas inserted after the colophon. There the work is introduced with the title, *Wheel of Nine Positions' Properties*, phyogs chos dgu'i 'khor lo. The title of the work found in other editions of the Tengyur is given second, *Delineating the Wheel of Reasons*, hetucakrahamaru, gtan tshigs kyi 'khor lo gtan la dbab pa.

ways and to the dissimilar class as a pervader and (iv) actual unascertained reason that relates to the similar class as a pervader and to the dissimilar class in two ways.

The first: at the time of stating, 'The subject, sound: it is permanent because the horn of a hare is not existent,' that, for instance.

The second: [95] at the time of stating, 'The subject, sound: it is permanent because it does not possess intelligence,' that, for instance.

The third: at the time of stating, 'The subject sound: it is not arisen from effort because it is impermanent,' that, for instance.

The fourth: at the time of stating, 'The subject, sound: it is permanent because it is an object of comprehension,' that, for instance.

Secondly (fr. p. 34), with respect to reason possessing remainder, there are two: definition and divisions.

The first: **it is a common unascertained reason in the proof of that and, by the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that, it is not ascertained as existing in both the similar class and the dissimilar class in the proof of that** is the definition of it being a reason possessing remainder in the proof of that.

Secondly, if it is divided there are two: reason possessing correct remainder and reason possessing contradictory remainder.

The first: **it is a reason possessing remainder in the proof of that and, by the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that, it is ascertained as existing in the similar class in the proof of that** [96] is the definition of it being a reason possessing correct remainder in the proof of that.

For example, for a disputant for whom omniscience is beyond his ken, speaks speech is a reason possessing correct remainder in the proof of the man over there who speaks speech not being omniscient, for instance.

The second: **it is a reason possessing remainder in the proof of that and, by the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that, it is ascertained as existing in the dissimilar class in the proof of that** is the definition of it being a reason possessing contradictory remainder in the proof of that. For example, for a disputant for whom omniscience is beyond his ken, speaks speech is a reason possessing contradictory remainder in the proof of the man over there who speaks speech being omniscient or for a person for whom a god is beyond his ken, speaks speech is a reason possessing contradictory remainder in the proof of the person over there who speaks speech having passed away from being a god, for instance.

The significance of the two possessing remainder is that, by the person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of that, [97] it being ascertained as existing in the similar class in the proof of that is a cause of it being a correct sign in the proof of that but, upon not being ascertained by him as non-existent in the dissimilar class in the proof of that, it is posited as possessing correct remainder. It being ascertained as existing in the dissimilar class in the proof of that by such a person is a cause of it being a contradictory sign in the proof of that but, upon not being ascertained by him as non-existent in the similar class in the proof of that, it is posited as possessing contradictory remainder.

Thus it should be known that, for the person for whom product has become the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent, there are two: for him either product is not ascertained or it is ascertained as existing in the similar class in the proof of that. In the first case, for him product is an

uncommon unascertained reason in the proof of that. In the second case, there are two: either it is not ascertained as the forward pervasion in the proof of that or it is ascertained as that. For the first person, product is a reason possessing correct remainder in the proof of that. For the second, product is a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent.

Thirdly (fr. p. 31), with respect to non-established reasons, there are two: definition and divisions.

The first: **it is set as a sign [98] in the proof of that and it is not the property of the subject in the proof of that** is the definition of non-established reason in the proof of that.

With respect to the second, there are three: non-established reason depending on the object, non-established reason depending on the awareness (p. 38) and non-established reason depending on the disputant (p.39).

With respect to the first, there are seven: (i) non-established reason due to the non-existence of the entity of the sign, (ii) non-established reason due to the non-existence of the entity of the subject, (iii) non-established reason due to the non-difference of sign and predicate, (iv) non-established reason due to the non-difference of basis and sign, (v) non-established reason due to the non-difference of basis and predicate, (vi) non-established reason due to the non-existence of the sign on the subject in accordance with the mode of statement and (vii) non-established reason due to the non-existence of a portion of the subject with the sign.

Examples in sequence

The first: at the time of stating, 'The subject, a person: he is suffering because of being pierced by a rabbit horn,' that, for instance.

The second: at the time of stating, 'The subject, a rabbit horn: it is impermanent because it is a product,' that, for instance.

The third: at the time of stating, [99] 'The subject, sound: it is impermanent because it is impermanent,' that, for instance.

The fourth: at the time of stating, 'The subject, sound: it is impermanent because it is sound,' that, for instance.

The fifth: at the time of stating, 'The subject, sound: it is sound because it is a product,' that, for instance.

The sixth: at the time of stating, 'The subject, sound: it is impermanent because it is an object of apprehension of eye consciousness,' that, for instance.

The seventh: at the time of stating, 'The subject, tree: it is sentient because it sleeps at night with its leaves curled,' that, for instance.

With respect to the second (fr. p. 37), non-established reason depending on the awareness, there are four: (i) non-established reason due to doubt about the entity of the sign, (ii) non-established reason due to doubt about the entity of the subject, (iii) non-established reason due to doubt about the entity of sign and subject and (iv) non-established reason due to the non-existence of the flawless subject to be known.

The first: at the time of stating to a person for whom a flesh eater is beyond his ken, 'The subject, sound: it is impermanent because of being the object of comprehension of a flesh eater's valid cognizer,' that, for instance. [100]

The second: at the time of stating to a person for whom a smell eater is beyond his ken, 'The subject, the song of a smell eater: it is impermanent because it is a product,' that, for instance.

The third: at the time of stating to a person who does not know whereabouts of a peacock, 'The subject, on the middle of three mountain ridges: the peacock exists because a peacock is calling,' that, for instance.

The fourth: at the time of stating to the glorious Dharmakīrti, 'The subject, sound: it is impermanent because it is a product,' that, for instance.

With respect to the third (fr. p. 37), non-established reason depending on the disputant, there are three: non-established reason due to the proponent, non-established reason due to the opponent and non-established reason due to both proponent and opponent.

The first: at the time of an Enumerator stating for a Buddhist, 'The subject, mental happiness: it is without sentience because it possesses production and disintegration,' that, for instance.

The second: at the time of a Naked One, *Nirgrantha*, *gcer bu pa*, stating for a Buddhist, 'The subject, a tree: [101] it is sentient because it dies when the bark is peeled,' that, for instance.

The third: at the time of a Logician, *Naiyāyika*, *rigs pa can pa*, stating for an Enumerator, 'The subject, sound: it is impermanent because it is a product,' that, for instance.

## The Faults and Good Qualities of the Three, Sign, Example and Position

Thirdly (fr. p. 10), with respect to the explanation of the faults and good qualities of the three, sign, example and position, there are six: (i) fault of a sign, (ii) good quality of a sign (p. 41), (iii) fault of an example, (p. 41), (iv) good quality of an example (p. 42), (v) fault of a position (p. 42) and (vi) good quality of a position (p. 43).



The first: at the time of setting object of apprehension of eye consciousness as the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent, **by way of it being the positor** [definition, defining characteristic], **object apprehension of eye consciousness becomes a sign possessing a fault** is the definition of it being the fault of a sign. For example, a common base of being set as a sign and not being the three modes.

If applied to a base: **by way of it being the positor, object apprehension of eye consciousness becomes a sign possessing a fault in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of it being the fault of a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent. For example, a common base of being set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent [102] and not being the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent.

**By way of it being the positor, object apprehension of eye consciousness becomes a sign possessing a fault in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign object of eye consciousness** is the definition of fault of a sign<sup>17</sup> in the proof of that by the sign of it. For example, a common base of being set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign object of apprehension of eye consciousness and not being the three modes in the proof of that by the sign of it.

The two, sign possessing a fault in the proof of that and quasi-sign in the proof of that are equivalent. The two, quasi-sign in the proof of that and fault of a sign in the proof of that are not equivalent because if it is a fault of a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent it is necessarily the definition of sign possessing a fault in the proof of that. If you wish to know the extensive manner of refutation and presentation regarding these, they

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<sup>17</sup> The 2015 edition of the Tibetan mistakenly reads *rtags skyon can gyi mtshan nyid* instead of *rtags skyon gyi mtshan nyid*.

may be known from the Others' Purpose chapter of *Illuminating the Thought of the Commentary*.<sup>18</sup>

The second (fr. p. 39), the explanation of good quality of a sign: **any of the three modes in the proof of that** is the definition of sign possessing a good quality in the proof of that. [103] The two, fault of a sign in the proof of that and good quality of a sign in the proof of that are contradictory but the two, sign possessing a fault in the proof of that and sign possessing a good quality in the proof of that are not contradictory. For example, eye and ear are contradictory but the two, having an eye and having an ear are not contradictory, like that.

**Positor of a correct sign** is the definition of good quality of a sign.<sup>19</sup> That which is the three modes, is the illustration. **Positor of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of good quality of a sign in the proof of that. That which is the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent, is an illustration. Apply similarly to 'by the sign product...' and so forth.

The third (fr. p. 39), fault of an example: **positor of a similar example possessing a fault in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of fault of a similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent. The illustration: a common base of being held as a similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent and not possessing the definition of correct similar example in the proof of that. Apply similarly [104] to 'similar example in the proof of that by the sign product...' and so forth. Let there be certainty about the points that similar example possessing a fault in the proof of that and fault of a similar example in the proof of that are not equivalent and that the two,

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<sup>18</sup> See note 15. Vol. 2 p. 329-331.

<sup>19</sup> Omitted at beginning of this sentence, *gnyis pa ni*, a mistaken addition in the 2015 edition.

similar example possessing a fault in the proof of that and quasi-similar example in the proof of that, are equivalent.

The fourth (fr. p. 39), good quality of an example: **positor of a correct similar example** is the definition of good quality of a similar example. A common base of being held as a similar example and possessing the definition of correct similar example, is the illustration of that. **Positor of a correct similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of good quality of a similar example in the proof of that. A common base of being held as a similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent and possessing the definition of correct similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent, is the illustration of good quality of a similar example in the proof of sound as impermanent. Apply similarly to 'by the sign product...' and so forth.

The fifth (fr. p. 39), fault of a position: [105] **by way of it being the positor, the collective meaning of functioning thing and able to perform a function becomes a position possessing a fault in the proof of functioning thing as able to perform a function by the sign product** is the definition of it being the fault of a position in the proof of functioning thing as able to perform a function by the sign product. For example, a common base of being held as the position in the proof of functioning thing as able to perform a function by the sign product and not being complete in the five qualities, the meaning of entity and so forth, in the proof of that by the sign of it.

**By way of it being the positor, the collective meaning of functioning thing and able to perform a function becomes a position possessing a fault in the proof of functioning thing as able to perform a function** is the definition of it being the fault of a position in the proof of functioning thing as able to perform a function. For example, a common base of being held as the position in the proof of functioning thing as able to perform a

function and not being complete in the five qualities, the meaning of entity and so forth, in the proof of that.

**By way of it being the positor, that collective meaning becomes a position possessing a fault** is the definition of it being the fault of a position. For example, a common base of being held as a position [106] and not being complete in the five qualities, the meaning of entity and so forth. If it is a fault of a position in the proof of functioning thing as able to perform a function by the sound product, it is necessarily the definition of position possessing a fault in the proof of that by the sign of it.

The sixth (fr. p. 39), good quality of a position: **positor of a correct position** is the definition of good quality of a position. The illustration: complete in the five qualities, the meaning of entity and so forth, for instance. **Positor of a correct position in the proof of sound as impermanent** is the definition of good quality of a position in the proof of sound as impermanent. Complete in the five qualities, the meaning of entity and so forth, in the proof of that, is the illustration of that. Apply similarly to 'by the sign product...'

Here we say

With scripture and with reason's countless rays,  
The friend who clears the gloom from rivals' minds,  
Makes bloom the lotus of his students' minds:  
This is the matchless Panchen, Dharma Lord!

To help those with a constant wish to learn  
His reasoning texts' deep meanings but, fatigued,  
Cannot sustain so great a weight of words,  
I've made this digest of the best of texts.

It's hard indeed to help the partisan,  
Minds swayed by fiendish enmity and spite,

Who to the person, not the doctrine, tend.  
There's helping open-minded seekers though.

By virtue of whatever good,  
All moonlight white, that I've accrued,  
Derived from this, be long assured  
The teachings of the Sweet-voiced Lord.

*A Mirror Making All Things Clear, a Presentation of Signs and Reasonings* by the great Dre-Minyag Geshe Tsultrim Namgyel Palsang is concluded.